INTRODUCTION
In this article I will examine major concerns raised about the enumeration of legal capacity in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
1 I will set out a list of questions raised by scholars and other commentators regarding the obligation of States Parties to provide people with disabilities with the 'support they may require in exercising their legal capacity,' 2 pinpointing controversies and highlighting ongoing practical and conceptual issues. These questions will be considered with specific regard to the General Comment No. 1
('General Comment') of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ('CRPD Committee'), which was adopted on 11 April 2014 and provides specific interpretative guidance on Article 12 of the CRPD. 3 Article 12 aims to ensure that all persons are recognised as equal before the law, regardless of disability, and their legal capacity is promoted and respected on an equal basis with others. Article 12 establishes that all people have legal capacity regardless of disability (and regardless of mental functioning) and includes the obligation on States Parties to the CRPD to ensure equality before the law for people with disabilities and to provide them with the 'support they may require in exercising their legal capacity' on an equal basis with others. 4 According to the General Comment of the CRPD Committee, 'support to exercise legal capacity' includes a broad spectrum of support, some of which may engage legal mechanisms, some of which may not. Such support might include, for example, personal advocacy, plain language aids, decision--making assistance, and in exceptional circumstances -when it is necessary to make a decision where a person's wishes are unknown or unclear -using the 'best interpretation of a person's will and preference' to guide decisions. 5 'Supported decision--making regime' is a term used in the General Comment to refer to the broad elements required to implement this system of support. Supported decision--making is contrasted with 'substituted decision--making,' a term defined by the CRPD Committee as having three common characteristics: the removal of legal capacity 'even if this is just in respect of a single decision;' authorisation for appointing a substituted decision--maker by someone other than the person concerned 'against his or her will'; or the making of substituted decisions 'based on what is believed to be in the objective "best interests" of the person concerned as opposed to being based on the person's own will and preferences.' 6 It is important to note at the outset that Article 12 of the CRPD does not introduce a 'new model' of legal capacity per se. Instead, while the scope and content of the right to legal capacity in Article 12 is not new, its application is unique -restated as it is for the context of disability.
7
The obligation of States Parties under Article 12(3) to provide 'support to exercise legal capacity' to people with disabilities on an equal basis with others is seemingly novel in this respect. CRPD directives for realising 'universal' legal capacity in according to Article 12 are purported to produce a number of benefits. These benefits include: the promotion of personal autonomy, authority and control for people over their own lives; 8 the use of a more realistic account of autonomy and decision--making which take into account a person's social 5 CRPD Committee, supra n 3 at para 25. 6 Ibid para 23. 7 Kayess and French pointed out that the aim of drafters was not to introduce new rights but instead to restate existing rights as applied to people with disability; they also note the somewhat paradoxical aim to address the failure of existing human rights formulations to ensure the rights of persons with disabilities. context and interdependence; 9 providing a clear structure for addressing decision--making by people who may require support to make decisions, or whose will and preference is unclear; 10 and even realising a 'frontier of justice' by extending core civil rights to people with disabilities.
11
Yet despite these apparent benefits, the terms of Article 12 and the CRPD Committee's compliance directives have been seen by diverse commentators as wanting in key respects.
12
The increasing number of conceptual studies on Article 12
of the CRPD have identified numerous concerns - so many as to make it difficult to locate key issues. As such, the list presented here is by no means exhaustive. 13 Instead, the concerns were chosen for having been raised repeatedly in scholarship and law reform materials, or where issues appear to present significant risks or ambiguities.
The scope of analysis will extend beyond a human rights focus to include pragmatic arguments, including matters of resourcing, conceptual coherence and the out some of the major practical and conceptual concerns. The intention here is to raise a range of critical issues and to present possible counterarguments so as to better examine which issues the various implementation strategies may or may not address.
Finally, in assessing the costs and benefits of a particular interpretation and implementation measures for realising the right legal capacity on an equal basis, it is perhaps as easy to give the law too much credit for solving personal and social maladies, as it is too much blame for causing them.
14 One possibility is that any benefits of using the law for social justice in this way are overwhelmed by other powerful forces in society, such as resource allocation or wealth disparity. 15 Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the law authoritatively creates the power structures, institutions and incentives of disability service 'systems', which directly shape the lives of people with disabilities, their families and others. Further, the issues listed in this article concern the intersection of law and practice and are relevant not just to persons with disabilities, but also families and other informal supporters, legal and medical professionals, and service providers -all of whom will be impacted by, and may influence developments in current law and policy. The core significance of these issues to persons with intellectual, cognitive and psychosocial (mental health) disabilities rests on their being among the last groups to hold and exercise decision--making rights on an equal basis with others. 
The Right to Legal Capacity
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'must respect the rights, will and preferences of persons with disabilities and should never amount to substitute decision--making.' 41 In contrast, the term 'substitute decision--making' is defined by the CRPD Committee as follows:
Substitute decision--making regimes can take many different forms, including plenary guardianship, judicial interdiction and partial guardianship. However, these regimes have certain common characteristics: they can be defined as systems where (i) legal capacity is removed from a person, even if this is just in respect of a single decision; (ii) a substitute decision--maker can be appointed by someone other than the person concerned, and this can be done against his or her will or (iii) any decision made by a substitute decision--maker is based on what is believed to be in the objective "best interests" of the person concerned, as opposed to being based on the person's own will and preferences. 42 The contradistinction to substituted decision--making advanced in disability law, 'supported decision--making' is one type of support to exercise legal capacity.
Supported decision--making refers to a decision made by a person, on his or her own behalf, with support from others in order to exercise legal capacity. 43 There is some disagreement in the literature as to whether 'supported decision--making' should refer to statutory arrangements alone, 44 such as those found in British Columbia's
Representation Agreement Act 1986, in which formal supporters are authorised as 'associates' with specific legal powers. 45 Others draw on the term to refer to informal, support arrangements for decision--making to exercise legal capacity. 46 These conceptual ambiguities will be discussed later in the article.
A further conceptual distinction is advanced by Michelle Browning, Christine well as other proposals for non--discriminatory 'support' to exercise legal capacity in exceptional circumstances. These points will be elaborated upon in the following 48 Ibid.
section.
The above terms and concepts are useful for policymakers and practitioners wishing to implement support to exercise legal capacity on an equal basis. For the purposes of legal research, these distinctions help to clarify some of the conceptual ambiguities of Article 12. The analytical distinctions are not meant to be conclusive, nor will they provide an unfalsifiable judgment of being the 'right' or 'true' approach to all conceptual questions. But they can help avoid confusion, and can help to affirm when an analysis (particularly a human rights--based analysis) is good, or comparably better, for a particular purpose. 54
Major Issues in Debates about Support to Exercise Legal Capacity
The purpose of this article is to elaborate on the limitations, conceptual tensions and ambiguities raised in the literature on the application of the right legal capacity and the CRPD, to which I will now turn. The intention is to outline the concerns as clearly as possible, including a number of possible counter arguments, in order to provide a more complete analysis of CRPD Committee directives for achieving universal legal capacity in practice.
A. 'What About the Person in a Coma?' Are there Exceptions in the Provision of Support to Exercise Legal Capacity?
The most common critique of the CRPD Committee directive to replace substituted decision--making with supported decision--making is captured in the following questions: 'What about a person in a coma? How can Article 12 apply when a person is incapable of expressing any will or preference in the strict sense, or cannot 49 CRPD Committee, supra n 3 at para 29. 50 Ibid.
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Ibid para 21.
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This approach to linguistic issues is adapted from a discussion by Brian Bix. Bix, supra n 38 at 29.
consistently express a sense of "yes" and "no"?' Undoubtedly, there will always be situations where even a person's closest supporters cannot evince a sense of his or her will and preference. This may also include someone who has been institutionalised for decades or who is socially isolated and has no connection to others from whom to gain support.
In part, proponents who reject the view that some form of substituted decision--making should be retained have argued against acknowledging decision--making 'incapacity' or 'incompetency', as it risks fixing such a status without any countervailing incentive to accommodate residual expressions of a person's will and preference.
55
This risk is particularly pointed to people with disabilities given a long history of their being considered to have limitations that are 'natural' and fateful, but which are in fact socially engineered, born from low--expectations or a lack of accommodations due to underdeveloped or unavailable assistive technology. Nevertheless, there will remain individuals for whom no relationships of trust exist and for whom not enough intention is expressed to guide decision--making.
There are clear risks to stretching the meaning of the term 'supported decision--making' to cover situations where decisions are being made 'for' a person, rather than 'by' a person. Quinn has argued:
…what's worse: stretching a fiction (100% support) to the point that it is visibly at odds with reality - a factor that is only likely to be seized on by States acting out of abundant caution and enter declarations or reservations ring--fencing substitute decision--making -or, admitting the obvious and then using our talents to lock in the exception and transform how decisions are 'made for' people? 59
More decisively, he concludes, '(w)e cannot trade--off the reality that decisions will be "made for" some people under the carpet in the hope of cementing into place the paradigm shift only for the majority.' 60 Acknowledging that decisions will be "made for" some people, particularly in times of emergency, immediately raises difficult questions. Certain types of psychosis and extreme self--harm, for example, raise particularly challenging issues (as will be considered shortly).
The CRPD Committee's General Comment offers some interpretative guidance on this point. The CRPD Committee indicate that Article 12 requires discarding the term 'substituted decision--making,' even as some of the practices currently seen to operate under the term may be retained. The CRPD Committee refers to the use of an interpretation by a third party based on the perceived wishes of the person as a way out of many of the difficulties described in the coma scenario and like situations.
For the comatose patient, the use of the 'best interpretation' by friends or family, or even by public officials who seek to identify the wishes and preference of an individual based on his or her life story, values and beliefs, would conform with the concept of support advanced in Article 12 of the CRPD. In the terms of the CRPD Committee:
Where, after significant efforts have been made, it is not practicable to determine the will and preference of an individual, 'best interpretation of will and preference' must replace 'best interests' determinations. This respects the rights, will and preferences of the individual, according to Article 12 (4). The 'best interests' principle is not a safeguard which complies with article 12 in relation to adults. The 'will and preference' paradigm must replace the 'best interests' paradigm to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others. 61 States wishing to realise this interpretation will be confronted with the challenge of 59 Quinn, supra n 23 at 16. 60 Ibid 18. finances. 62 It would seem difficult to apply support to exercise legal capacity in accordance with the CRPD when at first glance these approaches seem indistinguishable from the 'best interests' standard.
But while it might be impossible to stretch the fiction that the person is being supported to 'make' a decision in these exceptional scenarios, it is not inconceivable to suggest that the best interpretation of the person's will and preference by the supporters could be the principle driver in a decision, even as other guiding principles such as those advanced by the VLRC are applied. For example, supporters wishing to make an investment decision for a person who is non--communicative aside from a small number of physical and verbal cues known only to them, could reasonably presume that the person wishes to be free from harm and vulnerability, and would therefore prefer secure and stable investments. While robust mechanisms for addressing financial exploitation would be required (as they are under 'best interests' frameworks), as well as arbitration procedures to resolve possible disputes about the 'best' interpretation of a person's will and preference, this framework could conceivably extend to the exceptional cases, which are often advanced in debates about disability and legal capacity.
The CRPD Committee also included 'rights' as a third element of the 'best interpretation of will and preference' determination, stating that any such as to who decides, how they decide, and the extent of support that must be provided before such a decision is made. Another challenge will arise in instances where a person's 'rights' are seen to conflict with a representative's 'best interpretation' (or indeed the person's own wish and preference, as discussed later in the article). States wishing to heed the General Comment will be required to set boundaries as to how far the best interpretation of wishes and preference might stretch, and in giving due consideration to 'rights, will and preference' in establishing such boundaries.
B. Manipulation and Undue Influence by Supporters
The scenarios discussed in the previous section raise another common critique in proposals for implementing Article 12 -support mechanisms such as supported decision--making open the possibility of manipulation and unchecked abuse against people with disabilities. Adrian Ward argues that Article 12 was the result of 'inept drafting' where the definition of capacity is confused and confusing, leading to the potential for unbridled manipulation of people by so--called supporters. 65 He argued that a 'lack of clarity on this issue means that any reference to supported decision--making should be viewed as a flashing amber light requiring vigilance to distinguish 63 CRPD Committee, supra n 3 at para 21 (emphasis added). Certainly, evidence is required to measure the incidence of undue influence, coercion or abuse in supported decision--making arrangements, including identifying factors which may encourage or discourage subtle coercion and substituted decision--making.
As a starting point, it is important to note that all adults are subject to influence, pressure, manipulation and subtle coercion by those close to them. This 
67
See generally, Dhanda, supra n 10.
68
Quinn, supra n 23 at 19. 69 Ibid.
70
Gordon, supra n 9 at 62. 71 Ibid.
Indeed, the draft General Comment of the CRPD Committee was criticised for being unclear on this point.
72
In response, the final draft of the General Comment 
C. The Need for Boundaries Between Different Support Arrangements
Establishing comprehensive support to exercise legal capacity in law and policy would seemingly still require 'dividing lines' between different categories of support and safeguarding. This includes separating those categories in which a legislative mechanism is required where a decision must be 'made for' someone, rather than by that person, including where a persons wishes and preference are unclear or unknown, or are only discernible to a small number of people. autonomous (or 'legally independent') decision--making, supported decision--making and facilitated decision--making. 80 Each category in the model would be accompanied by a corresponding level of legal oversight. This would span from non--intervention with decision--making assistance, the provision of support mechanisms designed to help the person develop 'decision--making capabilities,' and facilitation whereby a supporter is appointed to make decisions 'for' another person using (in general) the 'best interpretation of his or her will and preference.' The challenge arises in setting out criteria for the application of these types of categories in ways that do not discriminate against persons with disabilitiesincluding practices that do not discriminate in effect. 83 As Genevra Richardson has observed, supported decision--making seemingly requires the creation of new boundaries which 'determine when support is to be offered and/or imposed and to provide for cases where decision--making powers are severely impaired and, despite all support, a decision with drastic consequences is maintained.' Bach and Kerzner, supra n 10.
81
Bach and Kerzner use the term 'decision--making capability' in a very specific way, to refer no to individual abilities or capacities but instead to '"capabilities to function" where function refers to the getting of things done or making things happen that are important to individuals or communities.' Further, capabilities for decision--making are 'a combination of… individual decision--making "abilities" and of decision--making "supports" and accommodations.' They use these terms 'as a way to conceptually integrate recognition of the functional diversity of individuals with an understanding of the array of supports and accommodations a person might need to enjoy and exercise his or her legal capacity.' Ibid 20--22.
82
These supports categories are: decision--making assistance, co--decision--making, and representative decision--making. In practice this would mean that:
(a)ny test of a person's ability to exercise their legal agency is actually a test of whether the supports provided to the person are adequate and appropriate to the task in hand. If not they should be altered until will and preference can be expressed, or it becomes apparent that this is not possible. 
D. Risk where the Person is Unaware of Harm Caused
Despite supported decision--making and broader support to exercise legal capacity 111 Again, a 'best interpretation of will and preference' could be used to guide a decision but adjudicating its application would be fraught indeed (as it is under current substituted decision--making and 'best interests' approaches). The issue of conflicting will and preference has been described rightly as perhaps 'one of the most difficult situations in which to apply Article 12.' 112
It is clearly outside the scope of this paper to consider the specific concern of conflicted will and preference in detail, or to discuss relative merits and drawbacks of generic suicide prevention legislation. The more important point here is the apparent need to explicitly define the emergency instances in which legal agency can be over--ridden and in which coercion can occur in ways that do not discriminate on the basis of disability (if this is indeed possible in substantive terms). capacity and countervailing collective interests. However, the General Comment directs that the right to legal capacity (on an equal basis) is non--derogable, even in emergencies. 115 It will be useful to seek guidance in international human rights law on this point. Indeed, discovering more suitable alternatives that comply with human rights standards yet provide suitable means for emergency intervention remains an on--going endeavour for governments and others wishing to advance the provision of support to exercise legal capacity on an equal basis with others.
E. The Limits of Legislative Mechanisms in Garnering Resources
Carney has argued that the success of supported decision--making can be measured by its ability to draw in resources, 116 which would apply equally to measuring the success of broader efforts to provide support for exercising legal capacity. He emphasises the limited role of legal mechanisms for addressing issues in service provision or civil society, and argues that legislative mechanisms for supported decision--making can 'only be judged by how well [they] mobilise… public or private resources (such as informal supports of civil society) in accordance with peoples'
individual set of values and preference (in this and other respects); but the point here is that agency is realised only to the extent that resources exist in the external environment.' 117 The South Australian Office of the Public Advocate reported at the conclusion of its supported decision--making trial that Carney's warning 'turned out to be very much the case in our trial, particularly when people made accommodation or support decisions… that then had to be resourced.' 118 Importantly, this argument is not directly concerned with cost--effectiveness, but rather concerns the acknowledgment that implementing supported decision--making and broader support to exercise legal capacity is dependent on material conditions. Flynn and Arstein--Kerslake argue that from a human rights perspective equality before the law is a civil and political right, for which there is arguably no limit 115 CRPD Committee, supra n 3 at para 5. to the level of support that must be provided to achieve this. 119 Further, as a brief note, it would be crucial that in any cost--effectiveness analysis -which this article will not engage directly -the comparative costs of the existing systems of substituted decision--making would need to be considered.
In fiscal terms, attracting sufficient resources for people requiring support to exercise legal capacity will continue to challenge. A number of governments around the world are transitioning to funding schemes for disability services that are self--directed by those receiving support. These schemes clearly dovetail with the emphasis on 'choice' in the application of Article 12 and may address certain deficits that currently limit the reasonable expectations of people with disabilities in making decisions about their lives.
120 But the evidence varies on self--directed funding schemes 121 and inevitably the issue of the most effective use of government spending to best realise support 'ramps' for exercising legal capacity will need to be carefully considered by reformers or others interested in implementation.
Interestingly, the PO Skåne model, a Swedish personal advocacy service for people with psychosocial disabilities -which was described by the European . 129 An innovative effort to strike this balance in policy terms, can be found in a supported decision--making trial in Victoria, Australia, by the Office of the Public Advocate. 130 The trial aims to mobilise citizen volunteers, using a paid facilitator, to develop freely--given relationships around socially isolated persons who may benefit 125 Ibid 23--24. 126 Ibid.
127
See Gordon, supra n 9 at 64. Ibid. Foucault coined the term 'governmentality' to describe the mentality, taken on by citizens, which is most accommodating to systems of power, particularly within the logic of the prevailing economic ideology. Hence, with 'neoliberal governmentality' the ends of reducing the scope of government - particularly the provision of welfare - can be realised by means of techniques that lead and control individuals without the State taking responsibility for them. Foucault, 'Security, Territory, and Population' in P Rabinow (ed), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (The New Press 1997) 67. Carter and Chesterman, supra n 132 at 19. 136 Ibid.
unreasonable transfer of risk and uncertainty by the State to persons with disabilities.
One counter--argument is that the CRPD framework for realising legal capacity on an equal basis explicitly aims to counter--balance the possibility of 'responsibilisation' by re--directing State duties and resources in strategic ways. An example would be the provision of support and 'reasonable accommodation.'
137
Another would be efforts in law and policy to prevent abuse, exploitation and neglect by decoupling substituted decision--making from protection against abuse, exploitation and neglect. 138 A second counterargument is that from a broader, structural perspective, the CRPD promotes a theory of change which rests on boosting the advocacy capacity of representative organisations of people with disabilities.
139
The increasing power of these groups, in combination with independent monitoring processes, could conceivably serve as a countervailing power against 'responsibilisation' by pressuring governments to adhere to human rights directives, including the provision of goods to enjoy the human rights set out in the CRPD. Finally, bolstering disability representative organisations will be important given such organisations would be well--placed to negotiate the extent of acceptable risk of 'responsibilisation' taking place. The re--orientation of State responsibilities in this way may be sound in theory but will require careful evaluation and monitoring to ensure its realisation in practice.
G. 'Net Widening'
Most commentators on supported decision--making see its potential for introducing a spectrum to what has heretofore been a crude binary division between those considered capable and those considered incapable of decision--making. A more nuanced spectrum of legislative intervention would help people avoid this binary system. However, Carney has raised the concern that such a spectrum may not help keep people out of adult capacity law arrangements, but will potentially 'widen the net' and capture more people into prescriptive decision--making structures: Similarly, though in a different context, mental capacity law reform efforts in Northern Ireland have included expanded criteria for assessing mental capacity in an effort to remain non--discriminatory against persons with disability. 143 The Draft Mental Capacity Bill 2014 is designed to 'fuse' mental health law and mental capacity law so as to avoid relying on a diagnosis of mental illness as a criterion for detention and involuntary treatment under current mental health legislation. The CRPD Committee did not explicitly respond to concerns raised about 'net--widening' in its General Comment. This is perhaps unsurprising given its mandate to monitor human rights violations against persons with disabilities specifically (and not all vulnerable individuals who may be affected by 'net--widening'). Further, the General Comment repeatedly emphasises the need for non--discriminatory measures of support in both form and effect and rejects 'mental capacity' as an entirely discriminatory concept, citing it as a barrier to equal recognition before the law.
Hence, the concern raised about net--widening rests not on a criticism of the model itself but rather on its implementation. Given the inchoate nature of the application of support to exercise legal capacity in practice, the issue of 'net--widening' demands careful attention by reformers wishing to apply the directives of Article 12. It is not clear how pilot programmes or empirical evidence could solve this particular problem in a way that law reform, which closely considers this potential pitfall, could not.
H. Gaps in Evidence on the 'Success' of Support to Exercise Legal Capacity
This last point brings up a final issue of note. A major gap in the literature on implementing a supported decision--making regime is the lack of empirical research.
Kohn, Blumenthal and Campbell describe this gap regarding supported decision--making (again, which is only one aspect of support to exercise legal capacity): 141 Ibid.
142
Supported decision--making holds promise both as an alternative to guardianship and as an element of the guardian--ward relationship. If it empowers persons with cognitive and intellectual disabilities to make decisions for themselves, as advocates of supported decision--making claim, it has the potential to advance the interests and human rights of persons with disabilities. However, without more evidence as to how supported decision--making functions in practice, it is too early to rule out the possibility that it may have the opposite effect. However, the paucity of empirical literature is not unique to supported decision--making.
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As Kohn, Blumenthal and Campbell acknowledge, 'there is also surprisingly little evaluative empirical literature on guardianship.' 154 Donnelly has raised similar concerns about the 'best interests' approach, observing of the literature that, 'the conceptual basis for the ["best interests"] standard has remained, for the most part, unexplored,' despite its widespread use.
155
The lack of evidence to support the efficacy of involuntary outpatient treatment under mental health law, such as 'community treatment orders' and 'assisted outpatient treatment,' 156 provides another example of substituted decision--making mechanisms in law that lack a strong evidence base to indicate its success.
It is noteworthy that governments are willing to implement such under--researched coercive measures, the success of which is unproven. The reason for retaining 'experimental law--making' in these cases can only be speculated at, though it is not unreasonable to hypothesise that risk--aversion drives government priorities with regards to substituted decision--making measures. Substituted decision--making approaches may be also strongly supported by some service providers and professionals. Light and colleagues produced evidence indicating that many service providers are convinced about the effectiveness of community treatment orders, 157 despite large--scale, randomised control trials failing to support such a view. Such conviction may in turn drive service delivery culture and entrench policy which adapts to using and relying upon forms of coercive intervention. 158 It also worth throwing caution to the wind as to claims about 'evidence--based law' more generally. Undoubtedly, empirical research is useful to debunk false myths which are advanced in legal debates. However, 'evidence--based law' is a relatively new field of enquiry compared to empirical testing in other disciplines, such as medicine or business, to which it is seeming better suited. 159 Rachlinski has argued that empirical testing for medicine, with its uniform mission to treat patients, is more straightforward than law -by contrast, 'law is often politics by other means.' 160 A useful legal and public policy issue to illustrate this point is the death penalty. The 155 abandonment of the death penalty in most jurisdictions to have done so cannot be explained by the accumulation of empirical evidence highlighting its ineffectiveness in preventing crime; instead, change was driven by evolving ideas as to what is moral and unjust. 161 Rachlinski argues that law often 'sorts winners and losers, rather than right and wrong,' and the imposition of empirical legal testing can cloud normative claims. 162 The call for 'evidence' regarding support to exercise legal capacity must be weighed against the qualitative criteria for justifying reform of substituted decision--making law and policy. Arstein--Kerslake argues that 'as a moral imperative… equality of people with cognitive disabilities is "right," and is the proper aim of law reform processes.' 163 She further argues that 'the prima facie inequality enshrined in legislation is sufficient evidence to demonstrate a need for reform to reach equality and compliance with human rights law.'
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From this view it can be reasonably asked why advocates for supported decision--making regimes are being asked to 'prove' whether such a model works.
Yet even if human rights are set aside in favour of pragmatic concerns, there are well--documented problems converting empirical legal studies into evidence--based law. 165 Again, the death penalty issue is illustrative. John Donohue and Justin Wolfers have undertaken a meta--analysis of research examining whether or not the death penalty deters crime in the United States of America. They conclude that despite decades of concerted social scientific inquiry there has been a consistent failure to demonstrate that the death penalty is any more effective than long prison sentences at deterring crime -yet neither have studies proven that the death penalty is not more effective than long--term prison sentences at deterring crime. 166 The methodological complexity of drawing a direct causative link between the death penalty and preventing crime seems comparable to the challenge of measuring the 161 'success' of replacing substituted decision--making with supported decision--making in law and policy. What measurements could be used for such a comparison? The 'wellbeing' of subjects is one option; another might be the rate of reported abuse before and after legal change. Yet in both these cases it would be extremely difficult to indicate direct causality between the conceptual basis for legal change and subsequent events. Again, even if human rights concerns are set aside, it is questionable to hinge the basis for implementing the universal legal capacity model as enunciated by the CRPD Committee on empirical evidence.
Conclusion
The issues listed in this article revealed a number of areas requiring further attention.
These include accommodating the substantially different ways people exercise legal
capacity, arbitrating what it means to do so on an equal basis with others, and operationalising support and safeguards in such a way that does not create discriminatory toe--holds for historic patterns of abuse, neglect and exploitation.
Addressing these concerns would require, among other things, tighter definitions of exceptional circumstances to justify overriding legal agency in emergency crises. If the right to legal capacity were to be applied as it is advanced in the CRPD, these exceptions would need to be non--discriminatory and defined within a human rights framework rather than being balanced against human rights considerations. Such reform efforts would need to be developed in ways that facilitate disabled people's organisations and independent human rights bodies to collaborate in deliberative processes to conceive and implement alternatives. Other concerns not raised in this article are also worthy of attention. Distinct challenges are likely to arise, for example, if previously informal relationships are formalised under supported decision--making schemes.
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Determining the legal responsibility of supporters and representatives, including consequences where duties are breached, will also require attention. Clearly, research is required on a number of fronts. Yet despite these gaps, the issues raised in this article provide no plausible reasons as to why domestic law, policy and practice could not be reshaped according to the CRPD Committee's elucidation of the right to legal capacity in international human rights law. The concerns and counterarguments listed here help to resolve certain ambiguities raised in current debates about Article 12 of the CRPD. The issues were listed to provide a more complete analysis of an idea being increasingly applied in law, policy, and in informal and formal support practices for persons with disabilities and others. While certain tenets of a supported decision--making regime can be set, some of its boundaries will remain fluid -and necessarily so. This flexibility is required given complex tensions inherent to the right to legal capacity itself, and to the CRPD generally, which concerns intersections between individual needs and broader social and legal change; between informal and formal support;
between State and civil society; and in competing accounts of equality and other core rights. 168 The findings I have presented raise important questions about how governments and civil society organisations can navigate these tensions to set the boundaries of support to exercise legal capacity on an equal basis for all citizens.
